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WHO OWNS THE COPYRIGHT TO
FACULTY-CREATED WEB SITES?: THE
WORK-FOR-HIRE DOCTRINE'S
APPLICABILITY TO INTERNET
RESOURCES CREATED FOR DISTANCE
LEARNING AND TRADITIONAL
CLASSROOM COURSES
GREGORY KENT LAUGHLIN *
Abstract: The Internet has spawned an increased interest in distance edu-
cation and in using technology to enhance traditional classroom courses. It
has also created new markets for faculty-created works. This Article explores
who owns these materials. The Article addresses the competing interests of
faculty and universities. Educators are concerned about academic freedom
and control of their work product. Universities are concerned about competi-
tion from their own faculty and the continued right to use faculty-created
material in which they have invested considerable resources. Both sides are
interested in who gets paid when others seek to use these materials. The Arti-
cle suggests that courts recognize a teachers' exception to the work-for-hire
doctrine, vesting ownership in faculty-creators. It also offers proposals for
written agreements which allocate rights between faculty and universities.
INTRODUCTION
"We always thought our new competition was going to be 'Micro-
soft University' . We were wrong. Our competition is our own fac-
ulty."1 These were the words of "the president of an elite eastern uni-
versity" as quoted in the lead paragraph of an article in the New York
Times on the growing dispute between educators and universities over
who owns the work product of faculty. 2 Until recently, many educators
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I Jacques Steinberg & Edward Wyatt, Book, Nola, &Commerce Comes to the Quad, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2000, § 4 Week in Review, at 1.
2 See id.
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probably had not considered this issue. Yet, as more faculty utilize the
Internet and more institutions of higher education develop distance
education programs, it is more important than ever that faculty and
the institutions at which they work have clear ownership policies. Ab-
sent amendments to the existing Copyright Act or clear institutional
guidelines, faculty and universities are left to find the answer within
the current Copyright Act and the cases which interpret it. Unfortu-
nately, these provide no clear answers. The outcome of this issue
through litigation likely will turn on the specific facts before each
court, thus providing limited precedential value, at least until a num-
ber of cases have wound their way through the courts.
This Article examines the use of information technology by edu-
cators and the status of copyright law as applied to faculty-created
works. It explores the applicability of the work-for-hire doctrine to
educators, as well as whether and when a teachers' exception should
apply. The assumption of this Article is that Congress will not act in
this area. If it does, then the Article's discussion of a teachers' excep-
tion could provide a framework for such action. The Article also ex-
amines some existing institutional policies that purport to deal with
these issues, and suggest how such guidelines should be drafted and
in ipleme n ted.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Use of Information Technology in Education
In a broad sense, information technology always has had a place
in education. Overheads, reel-to-reel movies, sound recordings, and
even blackboards, books, paper and pens are all types of information
technology. When first introduced, the printed book was a revolution-
ary change in education and culture at large .3 Today, we take such
3 See DOUGLAS C. mcMukriuE, THE BOOK: THE STORY OF PRINTING AND BOOKMAKING
136 (1943) ("In the cultural history of mankind there is no event even approaching in
importance the invention of printing with movable types."); see also LEVI SEELEY, HISTORY
OF EDUCATION 164-65 (1899). Seeley argued that printing "multiplied readers a hundred-
fold; it stimulated authorship; h revolutionized literature.... it was a miglity influence in
bringing about universal education." SEELEY, supra. This argument was echoed by Ralph 1.
Pounds, who wrote: "If there had not been some method for the cheap dissemination of
knowledge in print, it would have been quite difficult to support any argument for popular
education." RALPH L. POUNDS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATION IN WESTERN CULTURE
116 (1968). It has even been stated that "[t]he original copyright law upon which our sys-
tem was based (England's Statute of Anne) was a reaction to the invention of the printing
press." BnucE . A. LEHMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
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tools for granted, not even thinking of these items as information
tools. The past two decades, however, have seen an explosion in new
or improved tools for delivering information to students. Perhaps the
most prevalent information technology today is the Internet, but this
is only one example of a revolution in information media. While cable
television has been with us for decades, its use has spread remarkably
in the past two decades. The space program has brought satellite
transmissions. The late 1970s and early 1980s saw the advent of the
video cassette recorded These and other advances have been
adopted rapidly by a public with an unquenchable thirst for informa-
tion. It is only natural that educators would explore the use of these
and other advances in information technology in a profession which
is, after all, about delivering and interpreting information. 5
The term "distance education" has been defined as "a form of
education in which students are separated from their instructors by
time and/or space."6 In its Report on Copyright and Digital Distance Edu-
cation ("the Report"), the U.S. Copyright Office limited its definition
of "distance education" to "mediated instruction." 7 Mediated instruc-
tion was defined as "the delivery of instruction with a teacher active in
determining pace and content, as opposed to unstructured learning
from resource materials."8 The Report noted: "An individual course
may contain both classroom and distance education components.
Some online courses require brief periods of on-campus instruction,
INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Ricans 7,11.17 (1995).
4 See IBRAHIM MICHAIL 1'IEF7-ALLAH, THE NEW EDUCATIONAL TECHNOLOGIES AND
LEARNING: EMPOWERING TEACHERS TO TEACH AND STUDENTS TO LEARN IN THE INFORMA-
TION AGE 218 (1999).
5 The following have been identified ass information technologies currently being used
fin' distance education: audio cassettes, broadcast radio, broadcast television, compressed
video, computer-aided-instruction. correspondence, interactive television, independent
programmed learning (computer and paper based), multimedia (e.g., CD-ROM), satellite
television, short-wave radio, telephone (often referred to as "POTS"—Plain Old Tele-
phone Service), video cassettes, and the various Internet technologies. See itu.
ELLSWORTH, EDUCATION ON THE INTERNET': A HANDS-ON BUOK OF IDEAS, RESOURCES, PRO-
JECTS, AND ADVICE 428-29 (1994).
See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON COPYRIGHT AND DIGITAL DISTANCE EDUCA-
TION 10 (1099) (citing Comment 1, Indiana Commission for Higher Education ("1CHE"),
at 1; Comment 8. American Association of Community Colleges ("AACC"), at 2; Comment
20, University of' Texas System, at I) [hereinafter REPoicr ON COPYRIGHT]. This concept
has been assigned other labels, including "distance learning," "distributed learning" and
"distributed education." See id.
7 See id.
8 Id.
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for example, while many classroom courses use digital technology as a
tool for directed research, delivery of resource materials, or commu-
nication between teachers and students." 9
Distance education is a concept that is more than 150 years old,
originating in the correspondence courses of the nineteenth cen-
tury." During the first half of the twentieth century, radio was the
primary technology used for distance education." Television became
the favored technology for distance education in the 1950s; this me-
dium, along with video, is still widely used. 12 Audio cotiferencing was
introduced in the 1970s." The introduction of computer networks
and multimedia technologies in the 1990s spurred the current inter-
est in distance education.
B. Educational Use of the Internet
The decade of the 1990s saw an explosion in information tech-
nology that will have profound effects on education in the new cen-
tury. While the Internet has existed since the 1960s," in the 1990s it
9 Id.
10 See id. at 9,10. The earliest distance education arose in ihe nineteenth century, util-
izing the cheap and reliable postal services then available. See MICHAEL G. MooRE & GREG
KEARSLEY, DISTANCE EDUCATION: A SYSTEMS VIEW 20-24 (1996). In 1840, Isaac Pitman
started a correspondence course in shorthand, relying on Great Britain's "Penny Post." See
id. at 21. In 1856, Charles Toussaint and Gusav Langensheidt each began correspondence
courses in languages. See id. The earliest documented such course in the United States was
also in shorthand. See id. at 21-22. In 1883, the State of New York granted the Chautauqua
Institute authority to award degrees through a correspondence program conducted
thorough the mail. See id. at 20. After authorities rejected an attempt by educators at the
University of Cambridge to establish a degree program by correspondence, one of its ad-
vocates, Richard Moulton, migrated to the United States, where he assisted William Rainey
Harper in establishing the University of Chicago. See Moore & Kearsley, supra note 10, at
21-22. As president of the university, Harper established an extension program, making
the University of Chicago the first university with a distance education program. See id.
II See REPORT ON COPYRIGHT', supra note 6, at 13.
12 See id.
SeeJOHN TIFFIN & LA LITA RAJASINGHAM, IN SEARCH OF THE VIRTUAL CLASS: EDUCA-
TION IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 5 (1995).
14 The Internet is the product of a network created by the United States Department
of Defense in the late 1960s called ARPAnet. ARPAnet was designed to withstand partial
outages (such as might be caused by a nuclear attack) by communicating data via an
Internet Protocol (IP) and addressed to a destination computer. The data itself would be
divided into "packets" and these "packets" would be recombined. upon reaching the desti-
nation computer, with verification schemes to assure that all the data had arrived. At Inv,
only academic and research users had access to the network, but demand soon spread. See
ED KROL, THE WHOLE INTERNET USER'S GUIDE & CATALOG 13 (2d ed. 1994). While eke-
ironic mail was one of the earliest uses of the Internet and probably remains its most
widely used application, the advent of the World Wide Web, developed primarily at CERN,
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emerged from the exclusive domain of academic and government
researchers and into wide-spread use by the public. Growth in the use
of the Internet has occurred exponentiallyo Even before the World
Wide Web burst upon the scene around 1994, educational use of the
I nteri let was groWing. 16 At first, this use was largely limited to elec-
tronic mail—still probably the greatest use of the Internet. 17 With the
advent of the World Wide Web, the use of the Internet became easier
and more attractive to a less technologically sophisticated audience.
This created a dramatic acceleration in users"—a growth which is ex-
pected to continue into the early years of the twenty-first century. 19
Faculty in a wide variety of disciplines responded by setting up
Web pages and threaded discussion lists or news groups to enhance
the European Particle Physics Laboratory in Geneva, Switzerland, was the application that
brought the Internet to wide spread public awareness and use. See id. at 287.
15 See KROL, supra note 14, at I (stating that in the late 1980s, the Internet had only a
few thousand users but that by the time of his book the number of Internet users had in-
creased a thousand-fold.); see also LIEFZALLAII, supra note 4, at 153 (noting the growth in
IlibCr of Internet servers from 213 in August 1981 to 727,000 by January 1992).
16 See KROL, supra note 14, at 13. The development of the World Wide Web, begun in
1989 under the leadership of Tim Berners-Lee, used a new protocol, the hypertext transfer
protocol (or Imp) to "link" together information resources on the Internet using various
protocols (including tenet, Me transfer protocol (hp), gopher, and Imp itself). See id.
CERN released the results of its research to the public domain in 1992. By 1993, a team at
the National Center for Supercomputer Applications (NCSA) at the University of Illinois
in Urbana-Champaign led by Marc Andreesen created a graphical web browser called Mo-
saic. See CRICKET LIU ET AL., MANAGING INTERNET INFORMATION SERVICES 279-80 (1994).
Andreesen left NCSA the following year and became one of the founders of Netscape
Communications, Inc., the maker of the first commercially successful Web browser. Inter-
estingly enough, Mosaic was not the lust graphical browser to become available; a law
school-based project, Cornell University Law School's Legal Information Institute, devel-
oped the first Windows-based Web browser (Cello). Ste Cornell Law School, The Legal In-
formation Institute—A Quirk Overview, (visited March 15, 2000) <http://www.law.cornell .
17 See I'I EFZA MAE I, VIPM note 4, at 154 (stating that as of January 1997, 71 million peo-
ple were using e-mail, as compared to 57 million users of computer that provided World
Wide Web, hp. and other interactive TCP/IP services; by January 2001, these numbers are
projected to increase to 827 million e-mail users and 707 million users of other Internet
services, including the World Wide Web).
18 See Just How Wide is the Web?, PC MAG., Feb. 9, 1999, at 10 (citing a study by the mar-
ket research firm lI)C showing 68.7 million web users in 1997. growing to 97.3 million in
1998); see also I - IEF4ALLAII, supra note 4, at 153 (noting the growth in number of Internet
servers from 727,000 by,Jannary 1992 to 29,670,000 in January 1998).
19 See Just How Wide is the Web?, supra note 18, at 10 (projecting 131.4 million users by
1999, 170 million in 2000. and 227.7 million by 2001, a compounded animal growth rate
of 26%); see also FIEFZALLAEL supra note 4, at 153 (estimating 100,000,000 million servers
by January of 2000).
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their courses. 20 Some colleges and universities mandated at least some
on-line material for all courses.21 Many other colleges and universities,
while stopping short of mandating the use of technology in every
course, took steps to encourage faculty to incorporate Web sites and
other digital technologies into their courses. 22 At the same time, a
growing interest in distance education captured the imaginations of
college administrators. The new technologies offered innovative ways
to meet the educational needs of non-traditional students not able to
relocate to a college and, thereby, boost enrollinents. 23 In addition,
the Internet created a new publishing option—self-publishing elec-
tronically—for those wishing to make their research efforts available
on the Internet.
In a study conducted by the Department of Education in 1995,
more than 70% of higher education institutions reported that they
planned to start offering, or increasing, courses using online or other
computer-based technologies in the next three years." The study re-
ported technologies in use to include "e-mail among teachers and
students, class chat rooms, links to resources on the World Wide Web,
incorporation of preexisting content in the course of instruction, and
the delivery of supplementary materials in electronic form."25 Use of
these technologies have resulted in fundamental changes in the na-
ture of distance education. With the older technologies, communica-
tion between teacher and student was often one way, with limited in-
teraction via telephone or mail. The new digital technologies provide
more teacher-to-student and student-to-student interaction. 26 Further,
the new technologies permit both synchronous (or immediate re-
20 See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Young, A Fear of Web Pages for Every Course: UCLA Debates Their
Value, CDRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., May 15, 1998, at A29. At the time the article was written,
UCLA, which offers to make Web pages for professors, assessing students a fee to pay the
cost, had created more than 3000 courses during that year. See id.
21 For example, the University Technology Committee of Florida Gulf Coast Univer-
sity's Standards for Specific Types of Web Pages states: "Within any given semester, all
scheduled courses will he represented by a standard format home page." See Florida Gulf
Coast University, Wth Design Standards, (visited March 15, 2000) <lutp://www.fgett.edu/
utc/wds5.1itml>.
22 See Young, supra note 20, at A29. Some professors. fearing that the university might
claim ownership of the cotnse material they created, have rejected UCLA's offer to help
create Web pages for their courses.
23 See REPORT ON COPYRIC.IIT, supra note 6.
24 See id. at 14 (citing NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, DISTANCE EDU-
CATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS: INCIDENCE, AUDIENCES, AND PLANS TO Ex-
PAND (Issue Brief, Feb. 1998)).
25 Id.
26 See id. at 15.
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sponse) and asynchronous (or delayed response) elements to be a
part of the same course. 27 For example, "e-mail, threaded discussion
and self-paced testing" can be used for asynchronous education while
"chat rooms and streaming audio" can provide synchronous de-
ments. 28 The latter can even provide both synchronous and asynchro-
nous elements, with the streaming audio being archived for later re-
view. 29
The use of distance education is found at all educational levels. It
is, however, most prevalent in higher education. 30 By 2002, it is esti-
mated that 2.2 million college students—or 15% of all higher educa-
tion students—will take distance courses. 31 This will represent an in-
crease from 710,000 or 5% of all such students in 1998. 32
 In 1998,
62% of all four-year colleges offered distance learning courses; by
2002, this will increase to 85%. 33 One reason for this rate of growth is
that distance' education is seen as an important revenue source in the
academic and professional education market, which is already a $100
billion a year industry. 34 In addition, the federal government has ag-
gressively promoted distance education. The Higher Education
Amendments Act of 1998 provides for "financial aid for distance edu-
cation students, authorizes .funding for the development of distance
education programs, and established a 'Web-Based Education Com-
mission' to assess the educational software available for students." 33
C. The Potential for Dispute
One of the appeals of the Internet, at least to some, is that it rep-
resents a kind of cyber-frontier, where the civilizing influence of the
27 A communication is synchronous when the transmitter and receiver of information
operate in the same time frame, such as a fitce-to-face conversation and a telephone call; a
communication is asynchronous when the transmitter and receiver are operating in differ-
ent time frames, such as a letter or an electronic mail message written by the transmitter in
one time frame and read later by the receiver, Seel)FFiN & RAJA SINGI [AM, supra note 13, at
104.
28 See REPORT ON COPYRIGHT, SRpra note 7, at 16.
29 See id.
50 See id. at 11-12.
31 See id. at 19 (citing International Data Corp., Distance Learning Takes Off Fueled by




31 See REPORT ON COPYRIGI 514prfl note G, at 19.
3 '1 See id. at 22.
33
 Pub. L. N. 105-244, 112 Stat. 1581 (1998).
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law has not yet reached. 38 Much of the educational use of the Internet
to date proceeded without any serious consideration of the legal is-
sues created by such use. Historically, the ownership of the materials
prepared by educators for their courses has not been an issue 37; this
remained true as educators first began to use the Internet. 38 Like the
physical frontiers of the past, however, wherever technology leads, the
law is sure to follow. In response to changing technology, many
schools suddenly are rewriting their policies on how professors may
use course material .38
 Why this sudden interest? The answer is simple:
money.48
While no reported case has addressed directly the copyright
ownership of such materials, such cases are likely to emerge in the
coming years.° It is easy to imagine the scenarios in which ownership
of materials would become an issue. For example, suppose a professor
is placed in charge of creating a distance learning program in a par-
ticular subject. The professor creates a Web site, records video of lec-
tures, creates a chat room and an electronic mail discussion list (the
36 See TIFFIN & RAJASINGHANI, supra note 13, at 125.
37 See Lisa Guernsey & Jeffrey R. Young, Who Owns On-Line Courses? Professors and iver-
sities anticipate disputes over the earnings from distance learning, CHRON. OF HIGHER EOM.,
June 5, 1998, at A21.
See Isabella Hinds, Marketplace for Licensing in Digital Distance Education, in REPORT ON
COPYRIGHT, supra note 7, at app. E, p. 19. Hinds noted that in the course of her investiga-
tion into the current licensing activities that impact distance education, she reviewed the
programs and agenda of more than twenty-five conferences and workshops for distance
educators. See id. Of these, only one had any reference to copyright and licensing. See id. at
app. E, p. 19 n.6. That workshop was designed for academic adniinistrators to discuss fac-
ulty creation and ownership of distance courses. See id. She noted that the workshop was
"heavily subscribed almost immediately." See id.
39 See Steinberg & Wyatt, supra note 1, §4 at 1; see also Amy Dockser Marcus, Any Student
Can Have Him, WALL STREET J., Nov. 22, 1999, at Al (stating that after Professor Arthur
Miller videotaped a ten-hour lectiire series for Concord University School of Law, an on-
line law school, Harvard began to rewrite its policies on how professors may use course
materials. Other schools are doing likewise.).
40 See id, (discussing Harvard Law School's interest in his lectures videotaped for Con-
cord, Professor Arthur Miller noted: "I don't think it's undue cynicism to recognize that
many of the old-format educational products—books, monographs, articles—produce no
or very little revenue. They were of no concern to the university." Miller's colleague, Pro-
fessor Alan Dershowitz has expressed a similar view. Referring to the controversy between
Miller and Harvard, Dershowitz noted, "What distinguishes the Internet from everything
else is the number of zeroes. The money is so overwhelming that it can skew people's
judgment.").
41 See Guernsey & Young, supra note 37, at A21. At that time, Guernsey and Young
stated: "At the moment, the debate is also somewhat abstract. Few electronic courses, if
any, have become best sellers, or have even made much of a profit. There are even fewer
examples of profit-hungry universities' [sic) stripping professors of rights to course mate-
rials." See id.; see also text accompanying notes 44-49.
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communications of which are archived for future use), and even de-
velops examinations administrable on-line. The program is developed
over several years and becomes quite popular. The professor is then
offered the opportunity to manage a similar program at another col-
lege. The professor, naturally, would like to take her work product
with her. The university where she developed the course may want to
retain the material for its use. Certainly, the university would not want
to see another institution offering a course developed using its re-
sources, particularly if not compensated. While such concerns might
exist even when the materials are all paper based, the time and ex-
pense to develop a program using modern information technology
creates an even greater incentive for universities to claim ownership
of the materials. 42 It also is not difficult to imagine that a well-
developed package of course materials might have a market for resale
to other institutions. Naturally, the faculty member who created the
materials and the university for which she works both are interested in
at least a share of the potential profits. 43 Another possibility is that an
author of a treatise or casebook may want to use an article by another
professor (or even herself) self-published on a university Web site.
The author needs to obtain permission from the copyright owner in
order to use the article but from whom should she get such permis-
sion—the author or the institution employing the author?
The above scenarios are hypothetical examples of how disputes
might arise. We no longer, however, need hypothetical examples. In
late 1999 and early 2000, the Wall Street Journal and the New York
Times each reported on a dispute between Harvard Law School and
one of its well-known faculty members, Professor Arthur Miller."
Miller is one of the relatively few law professors whose name and face
is known to the general public. As legal editor for ABC's "Good Morn-
ing America" and host of "Miller's Court," a television program in
which a panel of experts examines a wide variety of public policy is-
sues,45 Miller has gained a celebrity unusual for an academic. In the
summer of 1999, Miller entered into a contract with Concord Univer-
sity School of Law, which is one of the first on-line law schools in the
United States. Under his contract with Concord, Miller gave eleven
42 See Guernsey & Young, supra note 38, at A21 (estimating the cost of developing "a
complete digital distance education course for delivery over the World Wide Web at
$10,000 to $15,000 per course.").
4/ See N.
44 Steinberg & Wyatt, supra note I, §4 at 1; Marcus, supra note 39, at Al.
45 See Marcus, supra note 39, at Al.
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lectures for a civil procedure course, which were videotaped for later
use by Concord's students. When Harvard Law School learned of this
arrangement, it objected, citing its policies that prohibit its faculty
from teaching for another educational institution during the aca-
demic year without the dean's permission. 46
Miller has denied that he violated that policy. Since he never
"meets, interacts, or exchanges . e-mail with any of the Concord stu-
dents," Miller maintains that he is not "teaching."47 Instead, he has
compared the videotapes to "casebooks, textbooks, hornbooks, stu-
dent aids, audio tapes, data collections, or other educational mate-
rial."48 As will be discussed below, many educators assume that they
own the rights to such materials under a so-called teachers' exception
to the Copyright Act's work-for-hire doctrine. When applicable, the
work-for-hire doctrine vests copyright for a work in the employer, not
the employee who created the work. 49 There has been little litigation
on whether and when a teachers' exception to that doctrine applies.
Although CongreSs held hearings and passed legislation dealing
with distance education,50 including its impact on intellectual prop-
erty rights, it ignored the issues addressed in this Article. Given that
Congress appears unlikely to act, educational institutions and their
faculty must develop policies that clearly set out their respective rights




48 See 17 U.S.G. § 201 (1994). Miller's dispute with Harvard does not appear to center
on ownership of the intellectual content contained in videotape but instead on Harvard's
policies restricting teaching at other institutions. See Steinberg & Wyatt, supra note 1, § 4 at
1. Ownership of course materials. however; has been recognized as being an issue in the
dispute. For example, Professor Henry Louis Cates, Jr., the head of Harvard's Department
of Afro-American Studies, in commenting on the dispute for the New York Times article
stated: "I've been teaching the same course, with modifications, for twenty-three years. I've
taught at Vale, Cornell and Duke, too, and when I moved to a new university nobody said
to me 1 couldn't take tiny course with me because the university owned it." Id. § 4 at I.
5° Section 403 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, required the Register of Copy-
rights to submit to Congress "recommendations on how to promote distance education
through digital technologies, including interactive digital networks, while maintaining an
appropriate balance between the rights of copyright owners and the needs of users of
copyrighted works," including recommendations as to legislation appropriate to achieve
this objective. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§ § 512, 1201 to 1205, 1301 to 1332 and 28 U.S.C. § 4001 (1994)); see also infra note 51 and
accompanying text. In addition, presently bills are pending in both the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate directly addressing distance education al the elementary and
secondary school levels. See Digital Education Act of 1999, H.R.2965, 106th Cong.; Digital
Education Act of 1999, 5.1029, 106th Cong.
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line use, rather than leaving the resolution of these very important
issues to the uncertainty and expense of litigation.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 and the Report on
Copyright and Distance Education
The growth in distance education and the use of the Internet
and other information technology for traditional courses has pro-
found implications in the area of intellectual property law, particularly
copyright. While a great deal of work already has been done, both by
the United States Copyright Office and Congress, most of the focus
has been related to the use of pre-existing materials in such courses.
For example, the Report on Copyright and Distance Education con-
centrates on fair use, licensing and related issues as they pertain to
pre-existing materials used in distance education. 51 The report cites
earlier efforts in this area, including the Conference on Fair Use's
("CONFU") proposed guidelines for distance education 52 and the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 ("DMCA" ) 5s. Section 403 of
the DMCA required the Register of Copyrights to submit to Congress
"recommendations on how to promote distance education through
digital technologies ... while maintaining an appropriate balance be-
tween the rights of copyright owners and the needs of users of copy-
righted works."54 This mandate, however, does not extend to address-
ing ownership issues with respect to materials created or adapted for
distance education courses. As a result, faculty who create such mate-
rials and the institutions which use them must turn to existing copy-
right law. These laws, however, were written before the wide-spread
use of the technologies spurring the disputes—the Internet and the
World Wide Web.
B. Clarent Status of Copyright Issues Between Faculty and Educational
Institutions
Naturally, the issue of ownership of faculty-created digital materi-
als has not gone unnoticed. Some faculty members, out of concern
51 See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON COPYRIGHT AND DIGITAL DISTANCE
EDUCATION (1909).
52 See id. at 116- 19.
" See id. ai 119-25.
51 Pub. L. No. 105-304,112 51x1. 2860. § 403 (1998).
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over this very issue, have refused to make digital material available for
their courses.55 Colleges and universities are just beginning to address
the issue, at least to the extent of planning to develop policies and
guidelines.56
 Harvard and other institutions are developing or revising
policies related to the outside activities of its faculty as a way of ad-
dressing university concerns about faculty selling course materials to
other institutions57 Developing such policies, however, can lead to
difficult negotiations between educational institutions and their fac-
ulty.58
 For example, faculty at Athabasca University, when confronted
with a university policy change, threatened litigation. 59
Both sides have legitimate concerns. Traditionally, it was pre-
sinned that educators owned the copyright to academic work they
have authored or created.° Academic freedom is cited as a primary
reason for such an arrangement. 81
 Educational institutions, on the
other hand, claim an interest in the work and point to the faculty's
55 See discussion ill supra note 22.
58
 For example, Florida Gulf Coast University's Institutional Policies and Procedures
identifies as one of several issues to be address in its Strategic Plan for Distance Learning,
the development of "iiIntellectual property rights and ownership policies for materials,
courses, and resources developed by FGCU faculty" See Florida Gulf Coast University, Insti-
tutional Policies and Procedures, (visited March 15, 2000) Clutp://itech.fgcmedu/distance/
Institutional_Policies_Procedures.html>.
57 See Steinberg & Wyatt, supra note I, §4 at 1.
58 See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Young, UCLA Contract Shows Complexity of Issues Involving Ownership
of On-Line Courses, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., June 5, 1998, at A23.
59 See Guernsey & Young, supra note 37, at A21.
6° See American Association of UniverSity Professors, Draft Statement on Copyright (visited
March 15, 2000) <littp://www.aattp.org/spccopyr. land> [hereinafter "Draft Statement"].
As noted earlier, the recognition of such ownership by educator is more a tradition than a
ride of law. Those who seek a legal basis often point to a "teachers' exception" to the work-
for-hire provisions of the 1909 and 1976 Acts, but can point to no controlling authority to
support it. See id•; we also Steinberg &I/Vyatt, supra note 1, §4 at 1.
GI See Draft Statement, supra note 60. The AAUP Draft Statement on Copyright argues
that academic freedom is threatened if the institution is the owner because "it would have
the powers, for example, to decide where the work is to be published, to edit and other-
wise revise it, to prepare derivative works based thereon (such as translations, abridgments,
and literary, musical, or artistic variation), and indeed to censor and forbid dissemination
of the work altogether. Such powers [are] deeply inconsistent with fundamental principles
of academic freedom." Id.; see also Ownership of On-Line Material, Letters to the Editor,
Clinotst. OF HIGHER EMIG., july•24, 1098, at BY ("If I contribute to a brochure, policy
statement, or World-Wide Web page for my institution, that may be work for hire. 1 o u r
representing the institution, not myself, and the institution should have the right to edit,
translate, or rewrite any of the material .... But when I design a course. the choice of
material, the order and method of presentation and discussion, the tools for assessment,
and—most importantly—the intellectual coherence of the course are mine and reflect my
education, scholarship, and point of view.").
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use of their resources in its creation.62 Institutions also can assert that
producing such work is part of the educators' employment obligation.
These institutions have legitimate concerns about losing the right to
use materials, created with.their resources, by a "salaried employee."
Even more troubling to such institutions is the prospect that the edu-
cator could sell the product to other institutions which, in turn, may
use these materials to compete against them—the institution which
incurred the cost to create the materials."
The American Association of University Professors ("AAUP") has
prepared a Draft Statement on Copyright ("Draft Statement") which
advocates that faculty members should be the owners of "courseware"
they develop for distance education programs." The AAUP notes that
while some institutions have policies that proclaim their ownership of
such materials, the Copyright Act of 1976 (hereinafter the "1976 Act")
requires a writing, signed by the author, to create a legally-binding
transfer of the copyright.65 Of course, this requirement is only rele-
vant if in fact the educator who creates the material is its owner. Cur-
rent copyright law leaves in doubt the issue of who owns such works."
Even if current law recognizes faculty-creators as owners, colleges and
universities could argue that employment contracts, which incorpo-
rate by reference such policies and which are signed by the educator,
satisfy the signed written transfer requirement of the 1976 Act. 67 Fur-
ther, as in Arthur Miller's dispute with Harvard, universities may seek
to prevent current faculty from selling their course materials to other
t2 See MO Statement, supra note 60. Resources used include office space and supplies,
library materials, computers, networking, university staff and student assistants.
63 See Steinberg & Wyatt, supra note 1, §4 at 1.
64 See Draft Statement, supra note 60.
66 See id.
6° See text accompanying notes 78-182.
Sre 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1994) (providing: . "A transfer of copyright ownership, other
than by operation of law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a nom or
memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed
or such owner's duly authorized agent."). While no case addressing whether a contract
between a faculty member and her institution which itmorporaie by reference a copyright
policy has arisen, there is no reason to believe such incorporation by reference would not
be sufficient to effect a transfer of copyrights. Whether all institutions in fact have a clause
in their contracts with faculty that incorporate by reference such policies is another issue.
In addition to being signed by the author, the writing purporting to transfer copyright
ownership must be clear. See, e.g., Papa's-June Music, Inc. v. McLean, 921 F. Stipp. 1154,
1158-59 (S.D.N.V. 1996) (citing Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen. 908 F.2d 555, 557 (9111 Cir,
1990)) ("[A) writing memorializing the assignment of copyright interests 'doesn't have to
be the Magna Carta; a one-line pro forma statement will do.' However, the terms of any
writing purporting to transfer copyriglii interests ... 1 mist be clear.").
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institutions under outside employment restrictions contained in uni-
versity policies or employment contractsP
The Draft Statement recognizes three categories of projects in
which a college or university "may fairly claim ownership of, or an in-
terest in, copyright in works created by faculty (or staff) members."69
Those three categories are "special works created in circumstances
that may properly be regarded as 'made for hire,' negotiated contrac-
tual transfers, and 'joint works' as described in the Copyright Act." 7°
As to the first of these, the Draft Statement recognizes an institution's
claim of ownership where the works were "created as a specific re-
quirement of employment or as an assigned institutional duty." 71 Ex-
amples given in the Draft Statement include "reports prepared by a
clean or by the chair or members of a faculty committee, or college
promotional brochures prepared by a director of admissions." 72
Course examinations were specifically identified as materials that
would be the exclusive property of the faculty member." As to the
second category, contractual transfers, the Draft Statement identified
as an example "a work prepared pursuant to a program of 'sponsored
research' accompanied by a grant from a third party," noting that in
such circumstances that "a contract signed by the faculty member
providing that copyright will be owned by the institution will be en-
forceable."74
 The Draft Statement continues:
Similarly, the college or university may reasonably request
that the faculty member—when entering into an agreement
granting the copyright or publishing rights to a third party—
make efforts to reserve to the institution the right to use the
work in its - internally administered programs of teaching, re-
search, and public service on a perpetual, royalty-free, non-
exclusive basis."
Filially, the Draft Statement provides: "In rare situations, ... it may he
proper to treat a work as a product of the joint authorship of the fac-
68 See Steinberg & Wyatt, supra note 1, §4 at 1; Marcus, supra note 39, at Al.






71 See Draft Statement, supra note 60.
75 Id.
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ulty member and his or her institution, so that both have a shared in-
terest in the copyright." 6
The Draft Statement expresses principles upon which a rational
allocation of copyright could be based. Its first category proposes a
logical analysis for whether a particular work created by an educator
should be deemed a work-for-hire. It is not at all clear, however, that
this is in fact the current state of the law." As to the second category,
there appears to be no legal basis for the implication that, absent spe-
cial circumstances, a signed writing purporting to transfer copyright
from an educator to an institution at which she worked would not be
enforceable. There is no language in the 1976 Act, or in case law in-
terpreting it, that indicates an educator lacks the capacity to transfer
copyright of her work product to the institution that employed her.
C. The Work-for-Hire Doctrine
1. General Principals
Generally, copyright initially vests in the author of the copy-
rightable work. 78 Specifically, the 1976 Act grants copyright protection
for "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of ex-
pression."79 Often the creator of a work and its "author" are the
78 See id.
77 See text accompanying notes 78-182.
78 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1094).'
79 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Section 102(a) provides:
Copyright protection subsists 	 in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which
they call be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either di-
rectly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the
following categories:
(1) literary works; ..."
td. It seems clear that such sites are copyrightable so long as they represent. original works
of authorship. Such files are fixed in a 'tangible medium of expression," namely an Inter-
net server's hard drive, "from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated ... with the aid or a machine of device," that is, by retrieval of a copy of the
computer file or files making up a web page from Ilse server on which the file or files mak-
ing up the page are stored through the use of a web browser, such as Netscape Navigator
or Internet Explorer, which, when retrieved, is displayed by the browser on the monitor of
the computer through which the file or files snaking up the web page were requested.
Thai the work is fixed on a server's hard drive instead of paper, fihn, or some
other older media would have no bearing on whether or not it is an original work of
authorship. There are two factors used to determine whether or not a work is original: it
must be of independent origin amid represent at least a minimal amount of creativity. See
Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Assoc., 8& 1 7.2d 663, 668 (7111 Cir.
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same.° This is not, however, always the case; section 201 (b) of the
1976 Act provides that a "work for hire" is the property of the em-
ployer of the creator of the work, not of the creator. 81
 Put another
way, the employer, not the creator, is the work's "author" for purposes
of copyright. The copyright statute defines a work-for-hire as "a work
prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employ-
ment."82
Copyright law is founded in article 1 of the Constitution of the
United States: "The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries."88
 Congress acted quickly in exercising this power,
enacting the first copyright statute in 1790. 84 Even before any statu-
tory or counnon law work-for-hire doctrine existed, employers were
claiming ownership of the works of their employees. The famous 19th
century photographer, Mathew B. Brady, claimed credit for any pho-
tographs created by any operator (as photographers were then
known) working for him, even when the operator made the images
after work hours and used his own equipment. 85 The work-for-hire
doctrine first appears in the law of the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries. The doctrine was introduced not by Congress, but by
1986) (citing L. Bailin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2nd Cir.) (en bane), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976)); %Vithol r. Wells, 231 F.2d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 1956); M. NIM-
MER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01 (1985). The Baltimore Orioles court distinguished the
concepts of originality, creativity and novelty, stating that "la] work is original if it is the
independent creation of its author. See 805 F.2d at 668 n.6. A work is creative if it embodies
some modest amount of intellectual labor. See id. A work is novel if it differs from existing
works in some relevant respect." See id. The court concluded; "For a work to be copy-
rightable, it must be original and creative, but need not be novel." Id. Faculty created web
material certainly can meet these tests, though it will require evidence in each case to de-
termine whether or not a particular work does in fact meet these tests.
e'C' 17 U.S.C. § 201(a).
81 See 17 U.S.C. § 201 (b).
82 See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
es U.S. CONS•. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
84 See Act of May 31, 1790, cll. 15, I Slat. 124 (1790).
85 See %Valiant Frassanito, The Photographen of Antietam, CAVIL WAR TIMES ILLUSTRATED,
Aug. 1978, at 17. Alexander Gardner and James F. Gibson, two Brady operators, copy-
righted their photographs of Antietam but Brady claimed credit and included the photog-
raphers' copyrights only in fine print. This practice actually led Gardner and others to
leave Brady's employment following the Battle of Antietam. Brady sold the images to
Harper's liTeekty which used them for engravings displayed in their publication, and also
held an exhibit in his New York studio entitled "The Dead of Antietam." See id.
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the courts. 86 Interestingly, the first case to address this doctrine, Col-
liery Engineer Co. v. United Correspondence Schools Co., involved the use of
a compilation prepared by an educator for the use of his employer. 87
The court in Colliery found that his contract of employment required
the educator, Ewald, "while a salaried employe [sic] of complainant,
inter alia, to compile, prepare, and revise the instruction and question
papers."88 From these facts, the court concluded that "the literary
product of such work became the property of the complainant [i.e.,
the employer], which it was entitled to copyright, and which, when
copyrighted, [the employee] would have no more right than any
stranger to copy or reproduce." 89 In Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing
Co., the Supreme Court cited the opinion in Colliery in finding that
"designs belonged to [an employer], they [sic] having been produced
by persons employed and paid by the [employer] in their establish-
ment to make those very things."9° This finding gave the employer
standing to sue for infringement. 91
Shortly after the Bleistein decision, Congress enacted the Copy-
right Act of 1909 ("1909 Act"), in which the work-for-hire doctrine was
first codified.92 The 1909 Act defined "author" to include "an em-
ployer in the case of a work for hire."'" In An Academic's Copyright: Pub-
lish and Perish, Leonard D. DuBoff asserts that "the congressional
committee that drafted the 1909 Act was concerned primarily with
materials for composite or encyclopedic works created by a number of
salaried employees for a large publication by an employer pub-
lisher."94 A study prepared by the Copyright Office, which was cited by
DuBoff, states:
It seems that the committee's major concern in this situa-
don is [sic] not its only concern--was with cases where a
"6 See Leonard 1). DuBoff, An Academic's Copyright: Publish and Perish, 32 J. COPYRIGIIT
SOC . 'S' 17, 18 (1985) (citing Bleistein Y. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239
(1003)); Colliery Engineering Co. v. United Correspondence Schools Co., 94 F. 152, 153
(S.D. N.Y. 1899).
87 See Colliery, 94. F. at 153.
9 See id.
89 Id.
9° 188 U.S. at 248-49 (citing Colliery, 94 F. at 153).
91 See. DuBoff, supra note 86, at 18.
92 SeeAct of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, Pub. L. No. 60-320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
93 Id. at § 62.
94 DuBoff„ supra note 86, at 19, citing B. Ringer, Study No. 31: Renewal. of Copyright
(1960), reprinted in 2 OMNIBUS COPYRIGIIT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 105-90
(C. Grossman ed. 1976).
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number of authors contributed to a single work. It is almost
as if the committees were unaware that the provisions con-
cerning works made for hire had been added the bills they
were reporting.
The committee report on this final bill indicates a likeli-
hood that the legislators regard a "work for hire" as a species
of "composite or encyclopedic work," and did not realize the
breadth of the exception they were creating. 95
Be that as it may, the work-for-hire doctrine created in Colliery
and adopted by the Supreme Court in Bleistein now was made a part of
the Copyright Act itself. If Congress intended it to apply only to com-
posite works, nothing in the language enacted indicated such a limita-
tion. Based on this language, the courts crafted a rule that makes the
employer the author of works created by salaried employees in the
regular course of their employment. 96
In 1976, Congress passed major revisions to copyright law. The
1976 Act included more detailed definitions and provisions related to
the work-for-hire doctrine. Specifically, the 1976 Act defines a work-
for-hire as "a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or
her employment."'" Additionally, section 201 provides, inter alio:
In the case of a work for hire, the employer or other persons
for whom the work was prepared is considered the author
for purposes of this title, and unless the parties have ex-
99 Id. at 138.
96 DUNA, supra note 86, at 21 (citing Siegel v. National Periodical Publications, Inc.,
508 17.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1974)); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Bryan, 123 F.2d 697 (2d Cir.
1941); National Cloak & Suit Co. v. Kaufmann, 189 F. 215 (C.C. Pa. 1911).
97
 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). A work can also he for hire where it is "specially ordered or
commissioned" under one of nine specifically defined circumstance "if the parties ex-
pressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a
work made for hire." Id. This appears to apply to works prepared by independent contrac-
tors, not employees. Since a writing is required to make such a work a work for hire, this
Article will not address works of this type as they may relate creations of faculty members.
It should be noted, however, that among the types of work covered by this provision are
"contributions to a collective work, instructional text, ... a test, ... answer material for
a test." Id. If a faculty member preparing such works is not an employee of the institution
for which they are prepared and if no written instrument exists showing an express agree-
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pressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by
them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright. 98
The 1976 Act did not define the terms "employee" and "em-
ployer" as used in the act. This led to a split among federal circuit
courts of appeal as to the meaning of those terms and, hence, the ap-
plication of the work-for-hire doctrine. One line of cases (represent-
ing the views of the Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits) focused on
the hiring party's control of the product that was the subject of the
copyright dispute." The Ninth Circuit utilized a multifactor formal,
salaried employee test. 190 The Fifth Circuit applied agency law to de-
termine whether the creator of a work was an employee as used in the
1976 Act. 1°1
In 1989, the United States Supreme Court accepted certiorari in
Community for Creative Non -Violence v. Reid in order to resolve this
conflict among the Courts of Appeal.102 I n Reid, an organization dedi-
cated to eliminating homelessness entered into an oral agreement
with a sculptor to produce a statue dramatizing the plight of the
homeless for display at a Christmas pageant.'" The sculptor provided
sketches to the organization of his proposed sculpture, a modern Na-
tivity scene depicting a homeless black family huddled on a streetside
steam grate. 101 The parties disputed the purpose of the sketches; the
sculptor asserted that they were to be used for fund raising while a
member and trustee of the organization claimed that the sketches
also were offered for his approval)" In any event, the sculptor did
make modifications based on input from the organization.'" The par-
ties, however, did not discuss copyright ownership. 197 When a dispute
arose between the parties as to taking the sculpture on tour, the sculp-
tor, who had possession of the work at the time, refused to return it
" 17 U.S.C. § 201.
99 See, e.g., Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas Publishing Co., 810 F.2d 410
(4th Cir. 1987); Evans Newton Inc. v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 E2d 889 (7th Cir. 198(1),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986); Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 E2d 548 (2d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
10 See Dumas v. Gonunermatt, 865 F.2d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 1989).
1 ° 1 See Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children & Adults of Louisiana, Inc. v. Playboy
Enterprises, 815 F.2d 323, 334-35(5th Ch.. 1987).
102 Sre Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 736 (1989).
Sre id, at 733.
1 °1 Sre id, at 734.
1 °5 See id.
106 See id.
1 °7 See Reid, 490 U.S. at 733-34.
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and filed a certificate of copyright registration. 108 A trustee of the or-
ganization filed a competing certificate of copyright registration on
behalf of the organization and commenced a civil action seeking re-
turn of the sculpture and a determination of copyright ownership. 109
The district court declared that the sculpture was a "work made for
hire" under Section 101 of the Copyright Act and found that the or-
ganization's trustee (on behalf of the organization) was the exclusive
owner of the work's copyright."° The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the sculp-
ture was not work-for-hire and that the sculptor was the copyright
owner.'"
In affirming the Court of Appeals' judgment, the Supreme Court
examined the legislative history of the 1976 Act as it related to the
work for hire provisions112 and noted that "[du the past, when Con-
gress has used the term 'employee' without defining it, we have con-
cluded that Congress intended to describe the conventional master-
servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doc-
trine." 113
 The Court, relying "on the general common law of agency,
rather than on the law of any particular (s] tate," offered a multi-
factor test to determine whether a hired party is an employee:the hir-
ing party's right to control the manner and means by which the prod-
uct is accomplished .... [;] the skill required; the source of the in-
strumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the
relationship; whether the hiring party has the right to assign addi-
tional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's dis-
cretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the
hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is
part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring
party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax
treatment of the hired party. 115
The Court noted that no one factor was determinative. 116
Several cases have applied and elaborated on the Reid test. In Ay
ms See id. al 735.
109 See id. at 735.
it° See id,
I" See id. at 736.
112
 See Reid, 490 U.S. at 743-48.
113 Id. at 739-40.
114 Id. at 740.
"5 Id. at 751-52.
116 Id. at 752.
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mes v. Bonelli, 117 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a
finding that Aymes, the creator of a software program, was not the
employee of Bortelli. 118 In so doing, the Court of Appeals criticized
the lower court for giving each of the Reid factors equal weight and
merely adding up the factors for each side in determining that Aymes
was an employee." 9 Instead, the appellate court found that some fac-
tors of the Reid test would have no applicability in some cases, while
others would "be significant in virtually every situation." 120 It
identified these latter factors as the following: "(1) the hiring party's
right to control the manner and means of creation; (2) the skill re-
quired; (3) the provision of employee benefits; (4) the tax treatment
of the hired party; and (5) whether the hiring party has the right to
assign additional projects to . the hired party." 121 Further, the court
found that these factors would not only "almost always be relevant,"
but concluded that they "should be given more weight in the analysis,
because they will usually be highly probative of the true nature of the
employment relationship." 122 The Ay Ines court cited six other deci-
sions which had adopted this weighted approach. 125 Using this
weighted analysis, the appellate court concluded that Aymes was not
an employee of Bonelli. 124
2. When are Faculty Members Employees?
Applying the factors outlined by the Reid Court, most faculty are,
without serious question, employees of the institutions at which they
work. Starting the analysis with the five factors identified in Aymes as
virtually always significant and deserving the most weight, the first fac-
tor—the hiring party's right to control the manner and means of
creation 125—appears to favor a finding that a faculty member is not an
117 See 980 F.2d 857,865 (2nd Cir. 1992).
118 id,
119 See id. at 861.
120 See id.
121 Aymes, 980 F.2d at 861.
122 Id.
123 See id. (Ming Marco v. Accent NW); Co., 969 F.2d 1547 (3rd Cir. 1992); MacLean
Assocs., Inc. v. Win, M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc., 952 F.2d 769 (3rd Cir. 1991);
M.C.B. Homes, Inc. v. Anteron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486 (11th Cir. 1990); Johannsen v.
Brown, 797 F. Stipp. 835 (0. Or. 1992); Kunycia v. Melville Realty Co., 755 F. Stipp. 560
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Kelstall-Whitney v. Mahar, No. CR'. A. 89-4(584,1990 WI, 69013 (E.D.Pa.
May 23, 1990)). It should be noted that the Reid decision does not suggest the weighted
approach.
124 See id. at 862-64.
125 See id. at 861.
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employee. Few universities seek to control the content, or even the
subject matter of a faculty-created scholarly work. Likewise, universi-
ties seldom provide detailed requirements (beyond a general re-
quirement to cover the subject matter) with respect to the content
and presentation of courses. Faculty members, however, are required
to teach, conduct significant research and publish findings in order to
obtain tenure. In addition, this factor could favor a finding that the
faculty member is an employee in circumstances where the university
assigns the faculty member a specific project—such as the preparation
of a distance learning course, material for such a course or, as seen in
the cases of UCLA and Florida Gulf Coast University, Internet-based
materials for classroom-based courses. 126
The second of these factors—the skill required 127—also seems, at
least at first glance, to favor a finding that faculty are not employees,
for faculty members are highly educated and accomplished scholars.
This factor, however, may encompass more than the skill needed to
create the content of the materials; it also may look at the skills
needed to publish those materials electronically. While many faculty
members have developed a great deal of skill in this area, others de-
pend on their school's information technology personnel or librari-
ans to convert their intellectual output into Internet-published works.
The third factor—provision of employee benefits128—definitely
favors finding faculty members to be employees. Most universities
provide employee benefits in the form of health care insurance, re-
tirement, tuition waivers or reductions and a number of other
benefits. Similarly, the tax treatment of faculty 129 in most cases favors
finding faculty to be employees. Universities typically perform tax
managing services such as withholding federal and state income taxes
and withholding the faculty member's portion and paying the em-
ployer's share of F.I.C.A. taxes.
An analysis of the final factor—the hiring party's right to assign
additional projects to the hired partyl"—produces mixed results
when applied to faculty members. Again, the university usually does
not assign specific research topics, but it may assign the courses
taught and, as at UCLA and Florida Gulf Coast University, require the
creation of Internet-based materials for the course, or require a pro-
126 See supra notes 20 and 21 and accompanying text.
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Lessor to create materials for a distance learning course she is teach-
ing."'
The Aymes formulation also requires determining which of the
remaining Reid factors apply to the particular case and the evaluation .
of those factors.'" One remaining factor that may influence finding a
faculty member an employee is the instrumentalities and tools used in
creating the product.'" Most faculty placing work on a Web site use
their institution's: libraries and on-line services to conduct research in
preparing the work; computers and software to conduct research and
to create the work; space on a server to store the work; Internet con-
nection to make the material available to the world; and, depending
on skill level, the assistance of other institutional employees through-
out the process of making the material available to its intended audi-
ence. Were a faculty member to use her own personal computer and
software to research and create the material and acquire and pay for
"publication" space from a commercial Internet service provider
("ISP"), then this factor would support a finding that she is not an
employee.
Usually, the location of the work factor 134 also would favor a
finding that the faculty member was an employee. Much, if not most,
of the effort in creating the work typically is done at the university.
Additionally, the work in many cases is stored and made available on
the university's server. Even if a large portion of the work is done at
home, this does not lead to a conclusion that the creator of the work
is not an employee, as will be discussed below.'" Applying this factor
to educators, however, presents some difficulties since their "product"
is created over an extended period, incorporating the totality of their
experiences. For example, when, as in Arthur Miller's case, an , educa-
tor uses previously prepared lecture material for an educational insti-
tution other than the one at which he is a faculty member, the evalua-
tion will be very fact specific. If the educator has taught the same
courses at several institutions over many years, it is likely that while the
material was prepared in the course of employment, it probably was
prepared and refined while working for different employers. Educa-
tors are not likely to leave behind the material they prepared for a
course at one institution when they take a position at a different insti-
131 See supra notes 21 and 22 and accompanying text.
I" See Aymes, 980 F.2(1 at 861, 863; Reid, 490 U.S. at 751-52.
1" See id.
111 See discussion supra note 48..
195 See Miller v. CI' Chemicals, Inc., 808 F. Stipp. 1238, 1240, 1244 (D. S.C. 1992).
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tution. 136 Further, an educator may incorporate concepts and expres-
sions in her course materials which she developed as a consultant or
through other outside activities. Nonetheless, in many cases, a court
could find that materials were prepared in the scope of the educator's
employment at the university at which he or she is a faculty member.
The duration of the relationship factor 137 also supports finding
that the faculty member is an employee. Both faculty and universities,
absent a visitorship or fellowship arrangement, anticipate an on-going
relationship of many years, not limited by the time needed to com-
plete any particular copyrightable work. As most full-time faculty re-
ceive a salary, the method of payment factorm also favors a finding
that the faculty member is an employee. The hired party's role in hir-
ing and paying assistants 139
 generally favors a finding that faculty are
employees, assuming that the university, not faculty, pay research assis-
tants. Depending on the nature of the work, which will be explored
more fully below, the work created may be part of the regular business
of the hiring party. 140
 Universities are in the business of educating
students, which includes the creation of courses and materials used in
those courses. This is true whether the course is classroom-based or
part of a distance learning program. Additionally, institutions of
higher education are in the business of producing and publishing
scholarly research. Although the final factor—whether the hiring
party is in businessm—at first may seem to favor a finding that a fac-
ulty member is not an employee, since most educators do not think of
themselves as working in a business, a non-profit entity is considered
to be "in business" for purposes of determining whether or not the
creator was an employee under the work-for-hire provisions of the
1976 Act. 142
 That faculty are employees of the institutions at which
they work seems beyond reasonable dispute. 143
'6 See discussion supra note 48.
' 7 See Reid, 490 U.S. at 751.
158 see id .
'" See id. at 751-52.
"0 See id. at 752.
141 see id.
142 See, e,g., Reid, 846 F.2t1 at 1487 (The plaintiff organization, Community for Creative
Non-Violence, was a non-profit, unincorporated association.).
'' See N.L.R.B. v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672, 679 (1980) (holding that full-lime
faculty were managerial employees under 29 U.S.C. § 152 (12) (1997)). Although the
Court was applying statutory definitions and thus this case is not directly on point, it is
interesting to note that none of the parties challenged a finding that full-time faculty were
employees. See id. at 681. The only issue was what category of employees they were under
the National Labor Relations Act. See id. at 674-75.
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3. When Is a Work Created by an Educator Prepared Within the
Scope of Employment?
Establishing that faculty are employees is only the first step in de-
ciding if the work-for-hire doctrine applies."4 The second step is de-
termining whether a specific work was prepared in the scope of the
educator's employment."' Courts have developed a three-part test
based on the Restatement (Second) of Agency for determining whether or
not an employee acted within the scope of her employment when
preparing a copyrightable work. Those factors, all of which must be
shown to establish that the employee was acting within the scope of
her employment, are: (1) whether the work is of the type that the
employee is employed to perform; (2) whether the work occurs sub-
stantially within authorized work hours; and (3) whether its purpose,
at least in part, is to serve the employer. 146
In Miller v. CP Chemicals, Inc., the federal district court addressed
the scope of employment issue. 147 The case involved an employee who
created computer programs which his employer continued to use af-
ter his termination. Miller was initially employed by CP Chemicals as a
technician in its quality control laboratory, but was soon promoted to
a senior laboratory chemist and ultimately to laboratory supervisor."'
While working as a senior laboratory chemist, Miller requested that
CP Chemicals purchase spreadsheet software; Miller intended to use
the software to store analytical data regarding CP Chemicals' cus-
tomer product specifications."' After being promoted to laboratory
supervisor, Miller organized the laboratory's records to meet federal
environmental and work safety regulations and completed computeri-
zation of all the laboratory's analytical data. 150 He also wrote a com-
puter program to compute complex mathematical calculations previ-
ously done manually, simplifying his duties and decreasing the chance
of error. 151 Miller's supervisors then asked him to do the same for
other products, which he did. 152 Miller, who was an hourly employee,
did most of this work at home and on his own time, receiving no addi-
1 " See 17 U.S.C. §101 (1999).
145 ,5re Miller, 808 F. Stipp. at 1243.
146 See Newark v. Beasley, 883 F. Stipp. 3,7 (D.N.J. 1995).
147 See Miller; 808 F. Supp. at 1242-44.
118




152 See Miller, 808 F. Supp. at 1242-49.
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tional compensation.'" Miller was terminated from his job in June
1991. Thereafter, he demanded that CP either return to him the pro-
grams he had written or pay a license fee for their continued use. CP
refused both demands. 164
Although the district court found that Miller failed to register a
copyright to the programs and thus had no valid claim for infringe-
ment, it nonetheless analyzed Miller's claim in light of the work-for-
hire doctrine. 155 The court noted Miller's contention "that the com-
puter programs were a result of his own initiative and that they were
written and tested at his home on his personal compute]:" 156 The
court turned to the comments to section 229 of the Restatement, which
provided: "(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employ-
ment if, but only if: (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits;
[and] (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the mas-
ter."157 The court further noted that the Restatement provided that "acts
incidental to authorized acts may be within the scope of employ-
ment" 168 but that "[t]o be incidental, . . . [the act] must be one which
is subordinate to or pertinent to an act which the servant is employed
to perform [and . must be within the ultimate objective of the
principal and an act which is not unlikely that such a servant might
do. "159 Analyzing the three factors from the Restatement, the court
found that Miller had acted in the scope of his employment when he
developed the software in question. 160
 First, the court found that while
Miller "was not hired primarily for the development of computer pro-
grams, ... he was responsible for the organization and updating of
the laboratory"161 and that "the development of the computer pro-
grams was at least incidental to his job responsibilities because it was
`within the ultimate objective of the principal and an act which is not
unlikely that such a servant might do. "162 Second, the court found
155 See id.
154 See id. at 1240-41.
155 See id. at 1242-44.
156 Id. at 1242.
157 See Miller, 808 F. Stipp. at 1243 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228
(1958).
15 See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 east. b (1958).
i" Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 cm'. h (1958)) (emphasis
ad(1ed).
16° See id. at 1243-44.
151 See id. at 1243.
162 Se( Miller, 808 F. Stipp. at 1243.
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that while Miller did much, if not all, of the development on his home
computer, it "was performed during the time period in which he was
employed by CP." 163 Finally, the court found that the development of
the software "was actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the
master."164 As a result of these findings, the court held that the devel-
opment of the software was within the scope of Miller's employ-
ment. 165
In perhaps a more analogous case, Marshall v. Miles Laboratories,
Inc., the federal district court held that an article written by an em-
ployee was done within the scope of his employment and the em-
ployer owned the copyright. 166 The employee argued that he had writ-
ten the article at home, was not specifically instructed to write the
article and received no additional compensation. 167 The employer
responded that the research for the article was done at work, while at
work the employee discussed the article with one of the employer's
scientists, this scientist was co-author of the article and the employee
received reimbursements from his employer for the costs of present-
ing the article at a symposium. 168 The court noted further that the
employee's job description included the development, summarization
and reporting of "information about advances in technology to" the
employer, in concluding that the employer owned the copyright. 169
Given the Miller and Marshall cases, it is hard to imagine that a
court would find that faculty-created scholarly articles, books and
teaching materials are not prepared within the scope of employment.
Faculty are employed to create scholarly works and to teach courses,
which of necessity requires the preparation of course materials. 170
Most faculty probably work on their scholarship and course prepara-
tion both at the office and at home. Even if a faculty member pre-
pared all of the material at home, the Miller case still would support a
finding that it was prepared in the scope of employment. Finally, since
I6' See id.
I61 See id. at 1243.
165 See id. at 1244.
166 SeeMarsliall v. Miles Laboratories, Inc., 647 F. Stipp. 1326,1331 (N.D. Ind. 1986).
167 See id. at 133(1.
160 See id.
1 " See id. at 1331.
17° It is typically presumed that a college professor prepares his or her own course q a-
terials, though lie or she may rely upon the works of others in preparing such materials.
For purposes of the analysis, ii is safe to assume such preparation for if an educator had
not prepared his or her own course materials, then there would be no basis for an owner-
ship dispute between ihe educator and the university.
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universities encourage, and even require, scholarship and teaching .
assignments, it unquestionably is difficult for a faculty member to as-
sert successfully that the work was not actuated, at least in part, by a
purpose to serve the university.
4. Is There a "Teachers' Exception" to the Work-for-Hire Doctrine?
Although courts likely will find faculty to be employees of educa-
tional institutions and their scholarship and course materials to be
prepared in the scope of employment, some writers nonetheless pro-
claim that an overriding "teachers' exception" exists to the work-for-
hire doctrine, vesting authorship in the teacher-employee rather than
her employer, 171 Other writers have denied that such an exception
exists. 172
In Hays v. Sony Corp. of America, Judge Posner discussed the
teacher exception.'" In Hays, high school teachers brought a copy-
right infringement action against a corporation that modified a word
processor manual, prepared by the teachers at the request of their
school. 174 The court stated:
Until 1976, the statutory term "work made for hire" was not
defined, and some collets had adopted a "teacher exception"
whereby academic writing was presumed not to be work
made for hire. [Citations omitted.] The authority for this
conclusion was in fact scanty, . . . but it was scanty not be-
cause the merit of the exception was doubted, but because,
on the contrary, virtually no one questioned that the aca-
demic author was entitled to copyright his writings. Al-
though college and university teachers do academic writing
as part of their employment responsibilities and use their
employer's paper, copier, secretarial staff, and (often) com-
puter facilities in that writing, the universal assumption and
practice was that (in the absence of an explicit agreement as
171
 See, e.g., MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 5.03031[11[1)11i] & n.04, at 5-34 to 5-35 (1994); Laura G. Lape, Ownership of Copyrightable
Works of University Professor• The Interplay Between the Copyright Ad and University Copyright
Policies, 37 Vim.. L. REv. 223, 246 (1992); see also Philip T. K. Daniel & Patrick D. Panken,
The Impact of the Electronic on instructor Creativity and Institutional Ownership within
Copyright Law, 132 Emit:. L. REP. 1 (1999).
172 see, e.g., Di ilSolr, supra Hole 86, at 18; Todd F, Simon, Faculty Writings: Are They 'Mitts
Made for Hire' Under the 1976 Copyright Act?, 9 J.C. & U.L. 485, 508 (1982-83).
173 See Hays v. Sony Corp. of America, 847 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1988).
174 See id. al 413.
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to who had the right to copyright) the right to copyright
such writing belonged to the teacher rather than to the col-
lege or university. 175
The court then sets forth the reasons for such an exception, in-
cluding the lack of university supervision of faculty in the preparation
of scholarly writings. 176 Asserting these reasons for a teachers' excep-
tion "are as forceful today as they ever were," 177 the court noted:
Nevertheless it is widely believed that the 1976 Act 'abolished
the teacher exception [citations omitted] — though, if so,
probably inadvertently .... To a literalist of statutory inter-
pretation, the conclusion that the Act abolished the excep-
tion may seem inescapable .... But considering the havoc
that such a conclusion would wreak in the settled practices
of academic institutions, the lack of fit between the policy of
the work-for-hire doctrine and the conditions of academic
production, and the absence of any indication that Congress
meant to abolish the teacher exception, we might, if forced
to decide the issue, conclude that the exception has sur-
vived. 178
Judge Posner's conclusions, however, are dictum and have no
binding, precedential value. 179 Nonetheless, this opinion is often cited
by advocates of the existence for a teachers' exception to the work-for-
hire doctrine.
175 Id, at 416.
176 See id. interestingly, the court set off "to one side cases where a school directs a
teacher to prepare teaching materials and then directs its other teachers to use the materi-
als too." Id. This caveat calls into the question the use of a teachers' exception with respect
to distance education materials since the situations appear analogous to each other.
177 See
178 Hays, 847 F.2t1 at 416. The court notes the lack of discussion of this issue in the leg-
islative history and asserts that "no political or other reasons conic to mind as to why Con-
gress might have wanted to abolish the exception," See id.
179 See id. The court addressed the issue of is teachers exception in relation to Sony
Corporation's claim for sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See id. at 418-19. The court held that the teachers had failed to perfect their appeal from a
lower court's dismissal for failure to state a claim. See id. at 419. The court went as far as to
note "[w]e need not try to decide the issue in the present case, for even if the 11976 Act]
abolished the teachers exception this would not necessarily spell victory for Sony." Id. ai
415.
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There is nothing in the 1976 Act to support a teachers' excep-
tion. 180
 Further, there is no controlling case authority to support such
an exception. One must look, however, at the policy behind the work-
for-hire doctrine and its effects if applied to educators to determine if
a teachers' exception is warranted. The possible applications of the
work-for-hire doctrine to the work of educators are many, but there
are three primary categories of work related to the Internet likely to
produce disputes: scholarly work (for example, articles, monographs
and books); course materials prepared for traditional classroom
teaching which are later adapted for distance learning or other on-
line publication; and course materials specifically prepared for inte-
gration into a distance learning program.
Absent agreements or policies to the contrary, scholarly work
generally has been presumed to be owned by the educator, not the
institution at which he or she works. There are good policy reasons
for this. First, the same policy that underlies tenure—academic free-
dom—supports faculty ownership of their intellectual work product.
If universities owned the copyright to articles, monographs and books
written by their faculty, they could suppress unpopular or controver-
sial views of their faculty. Faculty writings often have instigated or
propelled changes in the law and societal attitudes. Controversial sci-
entific opinions later have been accepted in the general scientific
community. Universities may be tempted to suppress views expressed
by their faculty which seem out-of-step with the views of alumni, pro-
spective students and their parents, and financial contributors. They
also may feel pressure to suppress novel or controversial ideas that
they expect to be rejected by the general academic community.
Second, faculty long have looked to royalties from textbooks,
casebooks and monographs for additional income. In general, educa-
tors accept lower pay to remain part of the academy when opportuni-
ties in the private sector beckon, The prospect of outside sources of
1 8° See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). The 1976 Act defines a "work made for hire" as includ-
ing "a work specially ordered or commissioned for use ... as an instructional text, as a test,
as answer material for a test ... if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed
by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire." Id. This section could be
interpreted as supporting a teachers' exception as to those type of educational materials
that can be overridden by a signed writing. One arguing against a teachers' exception
could point to this language and assert that any other type of educational material should
be presumed to be a work made for hire if the educator is an employee and created it in
the scope of her employment. This, however, takes the quoted language out of context and
assigns more meaning to it than the entire definition of a "work made for hire" would
seem to indicate.
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income helps some educators support that decision. Since economic
value for scholarly work is directly linked to the reputation of the aca-
demic in their field, depriving educators of the fruit of their labor
may compel scholars to leave the academy. As a result, the next gen-
eration of scholars would not receive the benefit of learning from the
most talented and respected thinkers in their field.
Since institutions of higher education never have received reve-
nue from such work in the past, applying a teachers' exception to
such materials published in electronic format does not deprive the
university of income on which it now relies. Nor does allowing educa-
tors to retain copyright to these materials create potential competi-
tion for the universities at which they work. That some such materials
have enhanced value due to the advent of the Internet and other high
tech media does not change these facts. Thus, a teachers' exception
to the work-for-hire doctrine should be applied to all such works.
Course materials are a different matter. If faculty own this mate-
rial, they can sell it to their employers' conipetitors. 181 There are,
nonetheless, good reasons to apply a teachers' exception to course
materials. Faculty develop more than expertise while working at a
university; they develop lecture notes, syllabi, teaching methods, ex-
amination and other evaluation material for the courses they teach.
Traditionally, when they relocate, faculty take their course materials
with them. 182 If the universities where they develop course materials
own those materials, educators would have no more right to the mate-
rial they developed than would anyone else.'" Without university
permission, they would be denied the ability to recreate their courses
at other institutions. This would have the effect of providing a power-
ful disincentive to faculty movement. Yet this very movement is impor-
tant to the dynamic nature of the educational system. In addition,
faculty may use portions of their course materials when conducting
presentations at seminars and conferences with colleagues in their
field. This use is also important in developing effective teaching
methods throughout the institution, and the academic community as
a whole.
11" Sr?, Steinberg & Wyatt, supra note 1, §4 at 1; Marcus, supra note 39, at Al.
12 See Marcus, se/na note 39, at Al (Professor Henry Louis Gates, Jr. exemplifies this
attitude. Commenting on Professor Arthur Miller's dispute with Harvard, he said: "I've
been teaching the same course, with modifications, for 23 years .... I moved to a
new university nobody said to tne I couldn't take my course with me because the university
owned it.").
I" See Colliery, 94 F. at 153.
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Universities could argue that it is one thing for faculty to take
their course materials when they move to another institution or to use
small portions in presentations, but it is quite another for them to
videotape lectures and provide examination materials to a competi-
tor—whether on-line or bricks-and-mortar—while still employed by
the university at which these materials were created. This position has
some merit. A rule certainly could, be fashioned that made faculty
owners of such works for some purposes but not for others. Such a
rule, however, would be cumbersome. Each new use of these materials
would create the potential for litigation. It also would result in differ-
ent treatment of these materials than has actually been the practice in
the past. That such material now has much greater value is no reason
to change the way ownership of course material is determined. While
universities may have waived any rights to ,course materials in the
past—because they believed that it was not worth the cost, both
financially and in terms of faculty relations, to assert such rights—the
fact remains that until recently there has been no serious effort to
prohibit faculty's outside use of course materials. The universities'
legitimate concerns in this area, as in any of the examples discussed,
are addressed better through written agreements that modify the
rules in ways that meet the specific interests of all parties.
Materials integrated into a university's distance learning program
are a substantially different matter. In such cases, the universities have
expended substantial resources, including the cost of converting the
educator's intellectual content into the formats required by the dis-
tance education technology. An educator's subsequent claim of own-
ership deprives the university not only of the benefits of its expendi-
tures, but could disrupt the entire distance learning program. While
this problem also may exist with traditional classroom courses, the
time and expense involved in integrating the content into a useful
format for a distance learning program increases the university's in-
terest. Further, students who enroll in such programs expecting to
take courses in a particular sequence face unnecessarily the risk that
these plans could be interrupted by a single educator. This, however,
does not support vesting exclusive rights to the intellectual content in'
the university, only that they have a perpetual, non-exclusive license to
use of the videotapes, computer files or other media comprising the
distance learning program. This license also should permit the insti-
tution to revise and update course materials for its distance learning
programs. The educator who created the course materials should
have the right to demand credit for its creation or, alternatively, that
her name be removed as the creator. This would allow the creator to
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receive credit for her intellectual contribution to the course while at
the same time permitting her to disassociate herself from it should
the material become out-of-date or be revised in a manner unaccept-
able to the creator. Competition, which may arise from other institu-
tiohs wanting to use the course materials should be resolved through
written contracts between educators and the universities for whom the
distance education material is prepared or adapted. If a faculty mem-
ber wishes to waive or limit her right to future use of such material as
part of her bargain with a university, she may do so, but the default
rule need not provide such a restrictive arrangement.
III. NEED FOR WRITTEN POLICIES AND GUIDELINES
Perhaps a case will eventually settle whether a "teachers' excep-
tion" exists to the work-for-hire doctrine. While the above discussion
presents a reasoned outline for a "teachers' exception," it would be
risky to both educators and institutions to rely on such an exception
at this time. Even if the issue ultimately is resolved in the courts, un-
necessary litigation costs and delays will be incurred by all parties to
the dispute. This uncertainty has and will continue to inhibit some
faculty who might otherwise create innovative Internet-based materi-
als. 184 Potential third-party purchasers of licenses or of the copyright
itself would be prudent to steer clear of a work whose ownership is
uncertain. Such third-parties would certainly factor that uncertainty
into any fees paid if less than all potential copyright owners agreed to
the license or transfer. Further, protracted negotiations between rival
claimants to a copyrightable work could lead a potential licensee or
transferee to find a comparable work elsewhere rather than wait for
the rivals to resolve their dispute. There is no evidence that Congress
will act to clarify the law in this area. For all these reasons, educators
and universities should have policies that clearly spell out the respec-
tive rights of the parties so as to avoid litigation and lost opportunities
for profit from educator-created works.
There are no one-size fits all agreements. The parties can and
should be creative in structuring ownership and licensing arrange-
ments, tailoring the agreements to meet the specific needs of the par-
ties involved. 185 For example, the parties may agree to joint ownership
1$4 See discussion in supra note 22.
185 An author under the Copyright Act possesses a "bundle of rights." These include
the right to reproduce the work, to prepare derivative works, to distribute copies Of the
work to the public by sale or other transfer, to publicly perform certain types of work, to
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using cross-licensing arrangements. This provides incentives for both
educators and universities to develop materials since each is assured
of its continued use of the materials. Additionally, an educator may be
willing to forgo the right to make future use of certain materials,
should she leave the institution, in exchange for additional compen-
sation. An institution may he willing to limit the time it is allowed to
use the material. How the faculty and institution divide any proceeds
from sales of integrated distance learning course packages also could
be negotiated.
Many examples of such agreements are available. 186 Agreements
range from one page documents, that set forth general principles for
deciding ownership and licensing issues, 187 to lengthy, detailed poli-
cies that define a variety of types of faculty works, the circumstances
under which the works were created, and provide for different owner-
ship and licensing arrangements depending on these factors.' 88 In
order to minimize potential disputes, perhaps the latter approach is
the wisest. 189
 Ambiguity invites disputes and litigation. Policies, guide-
lines and other agreements naturally will vary from institution to insti-
tution and even within institutions. The important issue is not the
precise terms, but that such policies and agreements are created, are
publicly display certain types of work, and to publicly perform the work by means of a digi-
tal audio transmission. See 17 U.S.C. § 106. There is no sound public policy reason why
these rights must all reside in a single person. Certainly there is no reason to prevent the
faculty and universities front allocating these rights between themselves, nor is there any
sound reason why a default allocation of rights could not be created by statute.
186 See University of Maryland, Collown, A resource oil copyright ownership for the higher edu-
cation community, (visited March 15, 2000) <Intp://wmv.informatmd.edu/copyown/pol-
icies/index.htnil > (containing links to the intellectual property policies of more than l00
institutions of higher education).
m For example, universities which have instituted policies of this type include:
Auburn University, Case Western Reserve University, The University of Chicago, Clark
University, Dartmouth University, Iowa State University, University of South Carolina,
Southern Illinois University and Yale University.
188
 For example, universities that favor more detailed policies and guidelines include:
University of Arizona, Brigham Young University, Brown University, Carnegie Mellon Uni-
versity, University of Georgia, Indiana University, Ohio State University, Syracuse Univer-
sny, Tulane University, University of Utah, and Washington University in St. Louis.
189 Length, naturally, is not always an accurate measure of the quality of the policy.
What is of importance is the degree to which the policy provides a clear understanding of
who has what rights. An ambiguous policy or one that tries to define every conceivable
scenario may create more problems than it solves, particularly if' the scenario that develops
falls outside any of the scenarios described. Nonetheless, as in the drafting of any other
agreement, definition of terms whose meanings may be less than certain and the inclusion
of provisions covering specific categories of works are preferred over those that give cm ,
sory treatment of the subject in general without recognition of the differences between
types of work.
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clear and deal with all foreseeable types of work. They should not be
limited to existing media, but should be written in a manner preserv-
ing the agreement's application to later development. When this is
not the case, they will need to be revised. An approach that relies on
policies and guidelines incorporated by reference in employment
contracts, while perhaps enforceable, is less desirable than one in
which each faculty member signs the writing that actually contains the
• terms of the agreement. This is the approach taken by Indiana Uni-
versity's Copyright Management Center, which created a sample
"Agreement for the Production of Distance Education Course Materi-
als."190 It is much more likely that faculty members will realize what
rights they keep and what rights they assigns to others when they sign
an agreement than when the policies are set forth in a faculty hand-
book or other lengthy document containing unrelated policies and
guidelines.
CONCLUSION
The advent of the Internet did not create the legal issues sur-
rounding faculty-created works, but only created greater incentives—
due to the enhanced value of the work—to litigate over ownership.
Perhaps the reason that people have accepted the notion of a teach-
ers' exception to the work-for-hire doctrine is that educational institu-
tions appear to lack sufficient incentive to challenge such an excep-
tion. This perception is likely to change as colleges and universities
scramble to develop and implement distance education programs and
faculty continue to develop polished Internet-based content for their
traditional courses. In order to encourage the fullest possible devel-
opment of on-line educational resources for the American public,
Congress should amend the 1976 Act to set forth clearly the respec-
tive rights and obligations of educators and educational institutions as
to educator-created material. Uncertainty cats only inhibit faculty
19° See Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis, Distant Learning Faculty
Agreement (visited March 15, 2000) Clutp://wsk-witipui. eduk-copyinfo/dlagreemt.html>.
The agreement was drafted by the Copyright Management Office at Indiana University-
Purdue University Indianapolis, directed by Professor Kenneth D. Crews of that university's
college of law. The Copyright Management Office's web site contains a wealth of material
related to the topic of this article. See Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis,
Copyright Management Center (visited Match 15, 2000) Chttp://www.itiptti.edu/-copy-
info/ ›. The proposed agreement could serve as a model for other institutions, though
this author believes that Section 2.2 is not entirely clear on whether a faculty member
could use materials prepared pursuant to the agreement in a traditional classroom course
taught at another school.
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from developing content which they would otherwise create. Absent
Congressional action, courts should recognize a teachers' exception
to the work-for-hire doctrine. Recognition and development of a
teachers' exception by the courts is likely to come slowly and unpre-
dictably if at all. Educators should own their works of scholarship and
course preparation, with licensing provided to institutions in circum-
stances where such works have been integrated into distance learning
programs. If this arrangement does not meet the needs of particular
faculty and uniVersities, tailored arrangements can be reached by writ-
ten agreement. Rather than relying on an uncertain outcome, educa-
tors and educational institutions should negotiate written agreements
that meet the needs of all the parties with an interest in copyright and
• licensing of the intellectual work product.
